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Fi, Fie, Foe, Perot:
Populist Giant or
Grim Illusionist?
A close analysis of a Texas
Twister.
by Richard Purcell
Ross Perot. The billionaire. The presi-dential candidate. The man whomade three references to the ToothFairy and the Easter Bunny in a recent
debate with the Vice President. However one
chooses to think of him, Ross Perot is an amaz-
ing individual. He simply did not exist as a
national political figure two years ago. Yet his
simple, down-to-earth approach to economics
and government ("just plain talk"), his success-
ful business background, and his stated desire
to "do what's right for my country" landed him
nearly 20 million votes in last year's presiden-
tial election —19 percent of the electorate —
without the support of any major party
(Fineman 34). A year later he remains the most
potent political force in the United States out-
side the Beltway. This kind of popularity by a
single, independent individual is unusual, to
say the least.
But contrary to Perot's own often used expression, it's
just not that simple. Ross Perot is a skilled political operator, to
be sure, but there are larger social, political, and economic
forces sustaining his popularity. White House pollster Stan
Greenberg is right when he says that Perot is largely a creation
of the voters. The Texas billionaire has reached his current level
of popularity because the public is dissatisfied with the nation's
leadership.
This voter discontent has been building up for some
time. Although the 1980s witnessed the longest period of eco-
nomic growth since World War II, many voters—indeed, many
economists—worried about changes in the underlying struc-
ture of the U.S. economy. In 1981 the U.S. had a budget surplus
of $8.2 billion and a foreign trade deficit of $34.6 billion dollars;
by 1987 the federal budget was running an annual deficit of
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$143.7 billion and a trade deficit of $170.3 billion (Phillips
Appendix H). American industry seemed to be losing out to
foreign competitors. The increase of foreign-made products in
the United States and the falling wages of factory workers
fuelled these worries. And despite considerable prosperity
experienced by the upper-middle class, many less wealthy
households were unable to maintain their standard of living
unless both parents were employed. In fact, after-tax median
family income (in 1987 dollars) had actually fallen from $25,518
in 1977 to an estimated $23,508 ten years later (Phillips
Appendix C). As political economist Kevin Phillips wrote, dur-
ing the 1980s "many Americans on the lower half of the eco-
nomic ladder had been losing ground. And even the affluent,
enjoying their champagne and raspberries, wondered how real
the good times were."(Phillips 5) Toward the second half of the
decade, with the national debt continuing to climb and the
stock market crash in 1987, fears that the U.S. economy was in a
permanent decline abounded. Many of these fears were exag-
gerated. Some were not.
Compounding these concerns were worries about the
fabric of American society and the ethics of its government.
During the 1980s and early 1990s Americans watched corrup-
tion and ineptitude appear to overtake their government, with
such scandals as Iran-Contra, the S&L failures, the Keating
Five, and the House banking scandal. Meanwhile, the percent-
age of Americans living in poverty grew to 13.6 percent by
1986, up from 11.4 percent in 1978—an increase of eight million
people (Famighetti 371). Crime also spread unchecked; the
number of murders in the United States increased by 25 percent
over a five year period, from 17,971 in 1988 to 22,540 in 1992
(Famighetti 967). AIDS, drug abuse, teen pregnancy, and other
societal problems further helped undermine the security and
stability of America's all important middle class. In the face of
this uncertainty, the federal government appeared gridlocked,
unable or unwilling to act on any of the nation's ailments.
Yet there was no political upheaval during the 1980s
for several reasons. One was that, despite long-term fears, the
overall economy was performing well. Many Americans pros-
pered during these years or, at the very least, held their own
with a reasonable amount of job security. The popularity of
Ronald Reagan also helped forestall political upheaval. Reagan
stood for clear principles: less government, Christian morals,
and a strong military. He was a likable man and a likable
leader, optimistic, jovial, and resolute. His confidence served
as a counterweight to the uncertainty of the Eighties boom.
The reality of the Cold War and its assurance of American
importance in international matters — reinforced by Reagan's
patriotic, anti-communist image — also made many voters
reluctant to make great changes in their government. Thus, in
the 1988 elections Americans chose a Republican president and
a Democratic Congress, reinforcing the status quo.
VOTER REVOLT. By the fall of 1991, however, thestate of the nation had changed considerably. GeorgeBush had taken over the White House and RonaldReagan had departed for his California ranch once
and for all, taking his eternal optimism and his firm leadership
with him. The Soviet Union and its communist allies no longer
existed, leaving America questioning its position in a radically
changing world. Worst of all, the United States found itself in a
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nationwide recession. Although not as
deep as previous economic downturn,
the recession unmasked the country's
concerns which had gone unaddressed
during the previous decade. An entire
litany of accumulated national ailments,
coupled with economic and social prob-
lems,quickly rushed to the forefront of
the nation's consciousness. As unem-
ployment rose to 7.4 percent and a grip-
ping economic uncertainly took hold of
the nation, Americans began to worry
not only about their job security, but also
about how they would be able to afford
such basic things as health care, college
for their children, and owning their own
home(Famighetti 133). Frustrated with a
government that seemed incapable of
decisive action, the electorate became
consumed with an anger toward conven-
tional politics that knew no ideological
bent.
And so the anti-incumbent
movement began. President Bush's
approval ratings plummeted from almost
90 percent in the spring of 1991 to below
40 perecnt by the end of the year, and
conservative commentator Pat Buchanan
declared that he would run against Bush
in the Republican primary.
Simultaneously, Harris Wofford, a dark
horse candidate for Senate in
Pennsylvania, defeated former attorney
general Dick Thornburgh, a Bush
appointee who was considered by many
to be a virtual shoe-in. In Louisiana, for-
mer Ku Klux Klansman David Duke
edged out reform governor Buddy
Roemer in the state's open primary and
gained 39 percent of the vote (and 55 per-
cent of the middle class white vote)in the
general election (Maginnis,342). It was
also around this time that the idea of
term limits for elected officials began to
gain in popularity. The electorate was
showing unmistakable hostility toward
conventional politicians.
What made this voter discon-
tent distinctive was the fact that it had
little to do with specific government poli-
cies. Rather, it stemmed from a deep
feeling among voters that government
simply did not belong to them any
longer, that instead it was controlled by
lobbyists and politicians out for their
own personal gain. The populism of the
1992 campaign reflected this feeling.
Jerry Brown,with the campaign slogan
"We the People," and Pat Buchanan, run-
ning on the idea of "America First," ran
surprisingly successful grass roots cam-
paigns in the 1992 primaries. The advent
of "town hall" discussions of national
issues between candidates and ordinary
citizens was another indication of the
election's populist nature,as was the
emphasis on "outsiders," candidates
with few connections to the Washington
establishment. As a result, Princeton his-
tory professor Sean Wilentz explains, this
mood among voters "has no specific
location on the political spectrum . . .
And because it is a mood, it is a singular-
ly effective tool for politicians who
would build their careers out of the accu-
mulated social injuries of an uncertain
time." (Wilentz, 35)
By early June, 37% of the
voting public said it
would vote for Perot if
the election were held
then,even though he had
not even formulated a
clear set of proposals
indicating how he would
govern.
LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION.Enter Ross Perot. All it took wasa casual appearance on LarryKing Live by the folksy Texan in
February of 1992 to send droves of pri-
vate citizens into action, collecting signa-
tures across the country in an effort to
put him on the presidential ballot in each
of the 50 states. By early June, 37 percent
of the voting public said it would vote
for Perot if the election were held then,
even though he had not even formulated
a clear set of proposals indicating how he
would govern (Barrett 33). Far more
than Jerry Brown or Pat Buchanan, Perot
filled a void left by more conventional
political figures: he would get things
done for the people. In an interview in
April of 1992, Perot said, "The point is
whether the American people want to
talk about it or do it. All Washington
does is talk about it. If you want to talk
about it, I'm not your man."(Carroll 27)
Unlike most other politicians, Perot
appeared as a man of action and he made
action look easy, at one point claiming
the country could get rid of its budget
deficit "without breaking a
sweat."(Church 39) Confident and deci-
sive, he ignited unhappy voters by
appearing as someone other than an
ordinary politician.
Thus, Ross Perot became
Opposition, the opposition to everytl
that Washington had come to stand
in the minds of many Americans. Y
defined as much by who he is not a
who he is. He is not a Washington
operative, nor is he affiliated with
political party. Perot's apparent lac
political experience is an asset to I
where it would be a liability for n
candidates. As he likes to say of him!
"I don't have any experience running
a four trillion dollar debt." Disaffet
voters like to hear such statements. T
don't care so much about specific p
posals for fixing the country's problf
as they do knowing that Perot re<
wants to fix them. The more detailed
becomes, the more he sounds like
average politician. His explosion o
the national scene as the at
Washington movement gathe
momentum was not mere happenstai
Ross Perot is as much historical phen<
enon as a product of his own genius.
His political talents, howev
should not be ignored. He has a k<
understanding of the alienation vot
feel from their government and he ma
use of this knowledge to sustain his p
ularity. His explanation of w
Washington no longer serves 1
American people, for instance, dovet;
with this feeling of disaffection. Pe
says, "The one thing I know at this po;
if I ever get stuck [in Washington], I ca
stay inside the Beltway. It's like living
a bubble. If you want to serve the p
ple,you've got to listen to real people,
you stay inside the Beltway, the spec
interests become the real people."(Can
27) Perot demonstrates his loyalty
"real people" by emphasizing the fi
that his wealth frees him from the cont
of special interest groups. He al
emphasizes his overriding desire to set
his country, that he is only acting on i
wishes of his grass roots supporters.
Perot likes to further distingui
himself from other national figures
emphasizing issues that the two politk
parties have merely glossed over. F
instance, during the presidential cai
paign he seized on the budget deficit ai
major focus of his campaign, linking it
the severity of the recession while t
other two candidates paid it only lip s<
vice. This strategy made him look lil
the only one of the three willing to tack
the country's fundamental problem
After Bill Clinton's deficit-cutting budg
was enacted this past August, Perot shi
ed his emphasis to attacking the No
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American Free Trade Agreement. In
doing so, he again sought to portray him-
self as the lone champion of the people,
uninfluenced by big companies or for-
eign lobbyists wanting to transfer
American jobs to Mexico. Similarly, his
continued harping on the need to curtail
the influence of Washington \obbyists
underscores his image as a man trying to
return government to the voters.
"I
JLs
" DONT HAVE A POWER DRIVE."
Figuring out Ross Perot's
motives is no easy feat. His
.supporters believe that he is
acting purely out of patriotism, just as he
claims, and certainly he has done a lot to
strengthen the political process. His
focus on the deficit during the 1992 cam-
paign alerted voters to its tremendous
importance to the American economy.
He is also right to raise the issue of spe-
cial interest influence in Washington.
His most important contribution, howev-
er, has been his psychological effect on
the electorate. The petition drives that
placed him on the ballot energized citi-
zens —many of whom had long since
given up on government—into partici-
pating in the democratic process. He
reminded many Americans that the gov-
ernment belongs to them. Regardless of
what one thinks of him personally, these
things must be counted in Ross Perot's
favor.
Nevertheless, it is easy to ques-
tion whether or not Perot's actions have
been examples of complete selflessness.
His manipulation of facts and issues
indicates that he enjoys the attention and
power his recent notoriety have con-
ferred upon him. "I don't have a power
drive," he told an interviewer once, yet
his actions indicate otherwise (Parker
26). Not long after the election, Perot
said he hoped he didn't have to run
again in 1996, that he would prefer to see
Bill Clinton's face on Mt. Rushmore.
Then, just a few months after Clinton's
inauguration, Perot claimed that the new
President wasn't suited for any job above
a "middle-management position" in a
"medium-sized company." (Fineman 24)
But this was not the only time he contra-
dicted himself. After arguing loudly for
reducing the budget deficit during the
presidential campaign, the Texas billion-
aire was wholly unsupportive of
President Clinton's effort at deficit reduc-
tion. During this summer's debate over
Clinton's budget, he criticized the
Clinton for relying too much on tax
increases, even though his own plan
would have raised taxes twice as much.
Perot was simply unwilling to allow the
President to steal the issue away from
him. To endorse Clinton's budget pro-
posal would have diminished his own
importance in national politics, and that
was something he was unwilling to do.
THREATENING THE ESTABLISH-MENT. Whatever his motives,Perot is undeniably a threat tothe two political parties. During
the 1992 election he siphoned off votes
from Bush and Clinton roughly equally,
and his loyal following composed of
roughly one fifth of the voting public
allows him to play the two parties off
The Republicans are in a
tougher position than the
Democrats. Because they
are the minority party,
they are forced to share
their opposition status
with Perot.
against one another without committing
to either. This ability gives him consider-
able leverage in national politics.
Moreover, the fact that Perot is a mani-
festation of voter opposition to tradition-
al politics forces him to keep anti-politi-
cian sentiments alive. Thus, he must
continually point out and even exagger-
ate the flaws in the nation's leadership if
he is to remain a political figure.
Ultimately this is counter productive
democracy, since it makes the electorate
even more divided than it already is and
reinforces grid lock. Yet despite this
threat from Perot, neither party seems
sure how to deal with him.
It is clear, however, that respon-
sibility for discrediting Perot (and sole
power to do so) rests with Bill Clinton
and the Democratic Party, since they are
the party in power. In order to under-
mine him, the Democrats must not be
afraid to attack Ross Perot personally.
Clinton has been reluctant to do this so
far, primarily out of fear of offending
Perot's supporters, although the
November debate between Al Gore and
Perot indicates that this reluctance is
abating. Polls show that Perot's follow-
ers are more dedicated to what he stands
for than Perot himself. Attacking Perot
would likely dislodge more of these sup-
porters while making it easier for Clinton
to popularize his own policies.
But if the Clinton Administra-
tion is to thwart Perot's desire to domi-
nate American politics it must do more
than attack Ross Perot the man: it must
attack Ross Perot the phenomenon, the
underlying reasons for his popularity.
1\us \s bcA\\ mote d\tf\cu\t and more
important than engaging in day-to-day
verbal sparring. Clinton must show that
government can take effective action
against the nation's problems. In plain
English, this means legislative successes
and an expanding economy. The
President must get a significant number
of his proposals enacted into law and be
able to convince the public that his ideas
work. If he can do these things, Clinton
will put Perot in a lose-lose situation.
Should Perot choose to endorse Clinton's
actions, he will be admitting that the
need for him as a political figure has
diminished. On the other hand, if he
belittles White House policies which are
popular with the general public he will
look as though he is only out for person-
al gain. In order for Clinton to succeed
he must not only achieve success in
Congress, but also convince the public
that his proposals willhelp remedy the
nation's problems. He has yet to do
these things, and as a result Perot still
looms large on the political horizon.
The Republicans are in a
tougher position than the Democrats.
Because they are the minority party, they
are forced to share their opposition status
with Perot. If Clinton proves to be an
unpopular president, the Republicans
will benefit—but so will Perot. The
Republicans would like to see him
undermined, but the most likely way for
this to happen involves higher approval
ratings for Bill Clinton. Currently the
Republican Party is divided as to how to
handle Perot. Some believe they should
accommodate him as a fellow opponent
of President Clinton. Indeed, House
Minority Whip Newt Gingerich is an
official member of United We Stand
America. One of the down sides to this
approach is that it gives Perot indirect
influence with the Republican Party.
Others want to keep their distance from
him, but this strategy would divide anti-
Clinton voters, benefitting no one but the
Democrats.
All three participants are
already jockeying for position in 1996.
Despite a recent drop in his approval rat-
ings, Perot still commands support from
roughly a quarter of the electorate. Will
he run again? The answer probably
Continued on page 9
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increase timber allotments, and have
indicated that they will seek congression-
al support to weaken the Endangered
Species Act in order to open protected
land to the industry.
For his part, President Clinton
was disappointed with the final plan
because it upset his consensus-seeking
sensibilities (Egan 23). He conceded that
Jim Bayley-
"We should support these
ideas while there's still
the opportunity. It's
probably the best chance
we're going to get."
not everyone would be happy with the
compromise but he believed it to be the
best possible arrangement. "We have to
play the hand we were dealt," Clinton
said. "Had this crisis been dealt with
years ago, we might have a plan with a
higher (timber) yield and with
more...protected areas. We are doing the
best we can with the facts as they now
exist in the Pacific Northwest"
(Diringer). The implication is that all
sides could have seen a better outcome if
earlier administrations had tried to
resolve the issue.
Though extremists on both
sides of the issue insist that the battle
over the forests is not yet over, many
accept the president's assessment. One
example is the community of Hayfork,
California, where citizens agree that a
compromise must be reached to preserve
the forests and reduce the area's 23 per-
cent unemployment rate. As the commu-
nity closest to the experimental logging
area, the town will pioneer techinques to
log specific areas in a manner that is less
ecologically devastating than the original
method and restore environmentally
damaged hillsides and streams. While
the generated timber will be less valuable
than that from big, ancient trees that
used to be cut, townspeople are relying
on skillful marketing to ensure success.
"A lot of people in timber still don't trust
the environmentalists," said Jim Bayley,
a small businessman in Hayfork, "but I
don't think there's much choice. If the
mill shuts down, we could lose half the
town's population. We should support
these ideas while there's still the oppor-
tunity. It's probably the best chance
we're going to get" (Martin).
The missing link in this attempt-
ed solution is money. According to a
spokesperson for an involved senator,
most congressional appropriations bills
to provide the funds have been passed.
While some of the Clinton proposal's
components can go into effect, most
forests are still being held by court
injunction until public comment on the
plan is concluded in March. After revi-
sions are made, the plan will be fully
enacted by Executive Order.
With the leadership of reform-
minded Babbitt and Thomas, the chances
for a long-term resolution are brighter
than ever before. As a result of the presi-
dent's leadership on the issue, communi-
ties will be stabilized and logging will be
curtailed in environmentally sensitive
areas. Instead of chaos, peace may final-
ly return to the much-maligned
Northwest forests. •
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depends on Clinton's popularity. If his
support is lukewarm, Perot will probably
throw his hat into the ring once again.
He recently told a crowd of support-
ers/'We're going to go marching down
Pennsylvania Avenue one day."(Ayres)
Indeed, UWSA could act as an effective
vehicle for a second run at the presiden-
cy. Newsweek describes it as "a careful-
ly crafted legal entity—a not-for-profit
'civic league' —that allows Perot to raise
funds and act the role of an undeclared
candidate without having to disclose his
list of contributors."(Fineman, "Ross,"
24) Even if he doesn't run again, it's
unlikely he will leave the spotlight on his
own accord. Perot clearly likes being an
influential figure, and if the Democrats
are unable to demonstrate their ability to
govern he will continue to be a headache
for both parties for some time to come. •
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